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Abstract 
This paper examines how intelligent people can be easily fooled by others. To do this, it 
examines how Bernard Madoff’s clients bought into his investment firm despite many signs that 
he might be running the biggest Ponzi Scheme in U.S history. Specifically, I examine the nature 
of his fraudulent scheme and how the clients fell into his trap. Why did they not do their due 
diligence and investigate Madoff’s fund more closely before investing millions of dollars into his 
fund? Was there something about his personality that made them trust him instantaneously? Did 
they have enough knowledge to figure out the fraud themselves? By investigating these issues, 
we can examine how humans can be deceived in financial matters and therein come up with 
several safeguards to ensure that investors do not make the same mistakes again.  
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Introduction 
In late 2008, one of the most respected men in the financial industry – Bernard Madoff, a 
former NASDAQ chairman, and manager of three successful companies – was accused and later 
convicted of the largest fraud in U.S. history – the Ponzi Scheme. Instead of running a legitimate 
hedge fund, Bernie Madoff took in his client’s money but did not make any real investments in 
actual stocks. Instead, he used the money of his new investors to pay off the returns to his old 
investors and kept all of his clients’ money in his private bank account.  
What is so amazing about the Madoff case is that he perpetuated the fraud for more than 
35 years in secret. Indeed, the only reason that the world was able to find out about the fraud is 
that he self-admitted it in late 2008 to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As a 
result, some of the largest international banks, hedge funds, charities, pension funds, and wealthy 
investors lost millions of dollars and had to declare bankruptcy. This fraud proves to investors 
that they should not assume due diligence even if the reputation of the person they are investing 
with is very high. In fact, it is critical that an analysis should be done to see whether the returns 
that Madoff was producing were achievable compared to the market at that time. In this thesis, I 
will examine the nature of his fraudulent scheme and how the clients fell into his trap. Why did 
they not do their due diligence and investigate Madoff’s fund more closely before investing 
millions of dollars into his fund? Was there something about his personality that made them trust 
him instantaneously? Did they have enough knowledge to figure out the fraud themselves? By 
investigating these issues, we can examine how humans can be deceived in financial matters and 
therein come up with several safeguards to ensure that investors do not make the same mistakes 
again.  
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Section 1. The importance of Madoff 
Bernard. L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC (BLMS) was founded in 1960 and 
operated as a securities broker-dealer in the United States and abroad. It provided executions for 
broker-dealers, banks, financial institutions and wealthy investors.  In 1989, the company 
became one of the largest independent trading operations in the securities industry, and handled 
around 5% of the trading volume on the NYSE (Rimkus). However, in December 15, 2008, 
BLMS was liquidated.  
The firm created a private investment portfolio division, where Bernard Madoff managed 
money for his investors. There were about 4,800 clients and included investment management 
firms such as Fairfield Sentry and KSM Capital Advisors, international banks such as Royal 
Bank of Scotland, Banco Santander, Bank Medici, Fortis, HSBC, BNP Paribas and BBVA, many 
Jewish charities like Los Angeles Jewish Community Foundation and Chais Family Foundation, 
and wealthy investors like Steven Spielberg, Ruth and Carl J. Shapiro, Fred Wilpol and many 
more. “The scam by Madoff wiped out $19 billion that wealthy investors, charities and 
celebrities had entrusted to him starting as long ago as the 1970s, based on approved claims so 
far” (Larson, Cannon). The impact was enormous and many places had to declare bankruptcy.  
Low volatility and high returns is a strategy that all investors dream to achieve and this is 
exactly what Madoff claimed to do. He had a consistent 1% return a month and 12% return a 
year no matter how the market moved for years (Markopolos). When in 2008, Bernard Madoff 
turned himself to FBI, he was all over the news with titles like “All Just One Big Lie”, “Talented 
Mr. Madoff”, “Inside the mind of Bernie Madoff”.  
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Section 2. Madoff’s Personality 
So who exactly is Madoff? Bernard Madoff was born in 1938 in Queens, New York. 
Using his $5,000 in savings that he earned from lifeguarding and installing sprinkler systems, 
Madoff created his investment firm called Bernard. L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC. He 
was considered to be an affable, charismatic, smart man who had respect among Wall Street 
financiers and investors. As his stature grew, he became chairman of the NASDAQ stock 
exchange. In this role, he helped shape securities regulations.  
In terms of his personality, there was no indication of him being a narcissist, manipulator 
or a liar when he was younger. One of his classmates from college said, “Bernie was very 
industrious, He was going to school and working at the same time” (Creswell). Another 
fraternity brother of Madoff, Martin Brill, said: “There isn’t much about Bernie that stands out in 
my mind. He was a low-key sort of guy who stayed out of trouble but also lacked any 
outstanding personality trait” (Salkin). However, as he got older, and became the head of his 
firm, his former colleagues recall the other side of Madoff - very impulsive, narcissistic and 
manipulative. Julia Fenwick, who was the office manager for Mr. Madoff’s London operations 
firm from 2001 until the unit was shuttered in 2008, said that “everything had to be perfect” and 
that “you never left the paper on your desk — ever” (Creswell). They also said that Mr. Madoff’s 
obsession with order and control of his environment never led them to believe that bigger 
problems existed. Indeed, his other former colleague said that “He had, from my perspective, a 
way of controlling you that was so subtle, it turns out that you didn't actually realize that you 
were being controlled” (Dennys).  
In fact, after the Madoff scandal broke in late 2008, many people in the media have 
portrayed him as sociopath. Harvard Professor Eugene Soltes notes in his book Why They Do It 
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that “to a psychiatrist, Madoff displays many symptoms associated with psychopathy. His lack of 
remorse, failure to take responsibility, inability to plan ahead, and persistent deceitfulness all 
contribute to such a designation” (Eren). Madoff never seemed to consider what could happen to 
his clients. In fact, in a personal interview with Madoff, he even self-admitted that “It wasn’t like 
I was being blackmailed into doing something, or that I was afraid of getting caught doing it.”  
He continues, “I, sort of, you know, I sort of rationalized that what I was doing was OK, that it 
wasn’t going to hurt anybody” (Nobel). This self-explanation of his behavior indicates that he 
really lacked remorse in what he was doing and showed a complete lack of empathy for his 
clients. One of the arguments is that when people are pressured to succeed, knowing the 
difference between right and wrong is not enough to dissipate the temptations of these behavioral 
traps. In this case, Madoff was under intense pressure since he was realizing that his deceit could 
not last indefinitely. In an interview with Madoff, while he was in prison, he said, “I allowed 
myself—and I really have to say ‘allowed,’ since no one put a gun to my head—to keep taking in 
more money. I kept on waiting for the environment to change and of course it never did… It 
turned into a total fiasco” (Nobel). This shows the psychological tendencies that can lead to 
irrational behavior.  
When his former colleagues discuss more about his abnormal behavior, they remembered 
how obsessive and compulsive he was about the floors where the legitimate businesses were. 
Indeed, one former colleague recalled that “Everything had to be black. The computers, the 
tables, even the picture frames. If he saw a kid’s picture in a silver frame, for instance, he would 
order the offender to get a black frame. If you had a jacket over the back of your chair, he would 
take it off” (Franks). This odd behavior seemed to suggest that Bernie Madoff wanted to make 
his business look perfect in order to get an impression of a legitimate and profitable firm.  
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As one said: "Narcissists focus their lives on appearances--they aren't strong enough to be killers, 
but they can be thieves--stealing to make themselves look better" (Lee). Bernie Madoff did not 
fear getting caught, and seems to be very narcissistic with a strong sense of entitlement. He was 
also strategically thinking about how to make his employees stay at the firm. Indeed, one of the 
employees said, “The salaries were so large because Madoff wanted to keep people happy; he 
wanted allies in case they found out what was really happening” (Lee). Having a good 
compensation is a smart way of making sure people stay at the firm.   
Section 3.  How did Madoff do it? Explanation of the scam. 
So how did Madoff achieve his remarkable returns? He claimed to use “a split-strike 
conversion strategy” to achieve his reported returns. Split Strike Strategy, also known as "collar" 
or "bull-spread", is a strategy of buying a basket of 30-35 blue-chip stocks of S&P100 and then 
protecting the stocks with put options. As Harry Markopolos, a mathematician and financier, 
who figured out the fraud in just a few hours, said, “Madoff had a consistent 1% return a month 
and 12% return a year no matter how the market moved” (Markopolos). This alone should have 
been a red flag to his investors. When Harry Markopolos was investigating the case, he spoke 
with different derivatives traders, heads of research, portfolio managers and investors about 
Bernie Madoff’s firm. Surprisingly, Markopolos realized that these people were, in fact, 
suspicious of Madoff’s fraud. So how come so many intelligent people were left unaware? The 
bottom line is that these people were willing to accept his nonsensical explanations as long as the 
returns kept coming in.   
The interesting examination again is that no matter if the index went up or down, Bernie 
Madoff returned the same 1% per month. Madoff's strategy description claimed that his returns 
were market-driven, yet his correlation coefficient was only 6 percent to the market. By looking 
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at these numbers, we can tell that his performance line was certainly not coming from the stock 
market. Moreover, it is a well-known fact that volatility is an important part of the market. 
However, it seemed like it did not apply to Madoff because he was reporting a 45-degree rise 
consistently. As we can see from the table below that was taken from Harry Markopolos’s book 
“No one would listen,” we can see that Bernie Madoff’s fund of funds Fairfield Sentry Limited 
indeed shows a 45-degree rise, while S&P 500 shows some volatility and cycles.  
 
So how come so many smart investors did not understand that it is not possible for the market to 
perform so well for so long. My hypothesis consists of the fact that investors had enough data 
and analysis to identify a possible scam. In order to prove that, I will examine the relationship 
between Madoff’s fund and S&P 100 and S&P 500. I will be using the data of Fairfield Sentry 
Fund from Harry Markopolos’ book because there is no available online data today. At that time, 
Harry Markopolos started working with Access, which was a large feeder fund to Madoff and 
Markopolos’s primary source of achieving this data. There were also a lot of arguments involved 
regarding the fact that Madoff’s purchased options were not reflected in the market activity, and 
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therefore, no one could see the footprints of his trades. According to Harry Markopolos, “You 
can realistically purchase only $ 1 billion of these, and at various times Madoff needed $ 3 
billion to $ 65 billion of these options to protect his investments — far more than existed” 
(Markopolos). In other words, there simply were not enough options in the entire system for him 
to be doing what he claimed he was doing. This should have been another red flag for his 
investors if they did a little bit of due diligence themselves. 
Section 4. Trust that investors had for Madoff.  
Many of his clients were considered to be sophisticated investors who would never 
question his ethical or moral standards. Among them were international banks, U.S based hedge 
funds, U.S individuals, endowments and charities, family offices, insurance companies and 
more. Many of them neither met nor heard of him, however, some investors were very close to 
Madoff. They all trusted him and were amused by his personality. In fact, one of his clients said, 
"He walked in, Bernie, and it was like you were subsumed by him. He had an aura about his 
confidence the way he was set up, the way he looked, the way he spoke. The self-confidence, 
that he knew he was in control, and if he was around, everything was fine” (Lewis). The 
description of his personality, shared by many of his clients, demonstrates his capability of 
manipulating so many intelligent investors, and for such a prolonged time. In fact, Madoff 
embodied the disciplined performer.  
Moreover, it is essential to introduce the availability bias concept to this paper, because 
this may explain why clients of Madoff so blindly trusted him. Availability bias is defined as a 
heuristic whereby people make judgments about the likelihood of an event based on how easily 
an example, instance, or case comes to mind (Behavioral Economics). In this case, investors 
judged the quality of investing with Madoff based on the information that was recently heard or 
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on all the good things they have heard about Madoff. In fact, a successful NASDAQ chairman 
and respectable financier would not scam his investors for millions of dollars. People would only 
pay attention to vivid things, and the more vivid the information is, less likely it would happen in 
real life. In this case, because Madoff was so powerful and famous on Wall Street, investors paid 
less attention to what he was doing with their money. 
Moreover, due to his extraordinary skill of impression management, he was able to 
influence a great number of smart people for a very long time. Moreover, Madoff’s seemingly 
random decisions to reject some potential investors, while accepting others was interesting. His 
main goal was to make the clients who had accounts with him feel special, part of the chosen 
fellowship. In fact, one of the really famous models, Carmen Dell’Orefice, who lost most of her 
savings with Bernie, remember how in Madoff’s office, her boyfriend, Levy, who was Madoff’s 
friend told her “This is very special, what I am doing for you,” indicating what an honor it was to 
be admitted into Bernie’s exclusive fund (Seal). 
Madoff was also targeting specific communities such as the members of the US Jewish 
community who were acquainted with Madoff through country clubs and social networks in 
Long Island and Palm Beach. There were charities, benefactors and showbiz names such as 
Pedro Almodóvar, Steven Spielberg and Kevin Bacon (Clark). Indeed, in the interview with 
Harry Markopolos, he mentioned how Bernie Madoff used “the affinity scheme,” which is 
targeting the community that is similar to you. In this case, Bernie Madoff was Jewish and 
therefore, many of his clients were Jewish investors who already created a connection with him 
instantly. Moreover, if some people still thought that Madoff is not trustworthy, the fact that his 
closest relatives and associates invested with him could have provided a non-conscious signal 
that he was an actually trustworthy advisor. In addition to that, according to Rebecca Lake, 
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“More than half of the clients surveyed by Vanguard found their current advisor through a 
referral” (Lake). This statement suggests that referrals are critical for growing a client base. 
Many of Madoff’s clients were referred to him by their friends, which suggests that his clients 
highly trusted him. 
The most interesting part is that none of these investors were able to catch his fraud, even 
though Harry Markopolos was able to prove it in just 4 hours using the data analysis. “If you 
could not trust Bernie Madoff with your money, there was no one who could be trusted” 
(Markopolos). This statement has been said multiple times by people who invested with Madoff 
and it clearly illustrates why investors should never assume due diligence, even if the person’s 
reputation they are investing with is very high. In 2008, many investors started withdrawing their 
money from Madoff’s company at a hastened pace due to the financial crisis. Some investors 
were even concerned by how Bernie Madoff was able to get such high returns for his clients 
even when the stock market was about to collapse. At this point, it was extremely difficult for 
Madoff to keep everything secret. As a result, he turned himself into the FBI and SEC. 
According to interviews, no one from his family or work knew that the whole firm was a big 
fraud; he was running the scheme by himself. 
To this day, Mr. Madoff’s victims are trying to receive their money back. According to 
Irving H. Picard, the trustee appointed by a federal bankruptcy court to liquidate the Madoff firm 
and return assets to investors, more than $13.3 billion has now been recovered (Picard). That 
amounts to 76 percent of the $17.5 billion in principal lost in the scam. Moreover, Picard’s office 
announced it was seeking court approval to distribute another $419 million of that money to his 
clients, bringing the total amount returned to more than $12 billion. 
Section 5. Consequences of his trust.  
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Bernie Madoff’s scandal negatively affected the economy from quantitative and qualitative 
perspectives. According to Umit Gurun, “The spread by word-of-mouth happens very fast and 
local media plays a big role in publicizing the bad news in the local community” (Gurun).  When 
the news about Bernie Madoff came out, his clients and other members of the financial 
community were affected by it tremendously. In fact, because investors were so skeptical about 
advisors after finding out about this fraud, they pulled over $363 billion from their advisors in 
favor of the relative safety of banks (Gurun). The withdrawals were so big in some areas that 
some investment firms ended up going out of business. 
This indicates that investors not only lost billions of dollars, but also lost trust in the 
financial system and advisory. Many people still question how it was possible for the smartest, 
richest and most sophisticated people in the world to not figure out what was going on with their 
money for over 20 years. Therefore, it is important to analyze and understand the psychological 
part of the trust that people had for Bernie Madoff. Trust underlies most financial transactions. 
When people go to the bank to deposit their money, they trust the system and the bank. When 
investors put a huge amount of money with an advisor hoping to gain some big returns, they trust 
that advisors will do their best job. Madoff's fraud was explicitly a shock to trust, as is made 
clear by the 45 mentions of "trust" in the 113 victim impact statements that were submitted to the 
court (Guiso). Additionally, the loss of trust was strongest in areas that were home to both 
Madoff victims and a large number of the affinity group.  
The social network plays an important role in having clients who can trust you. One of 
the investors said: “My money is in a fund managed by someone who resembles Bernie Madoff. 
If Madoff can defraud these investors of their savings, maybe my advisor can too” (Gurun). This 
phrase clearly indicates what kind of mentality investors had during that time. In fact, “Vanguard 
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found that clients were more likely to trust their advisors when they believed that their 
functional, emotional and ethical needs were being met” (Lake). This statement from 
Investopedia clearly indicates that after Madoff’s scandal, other investors had a very hard time 
trusting their advisors, specifically knowing that if one of the most respected advisors was not 
ethical with his clients, then other advisors are most likely not ethical either. 
Section 6. SEC Failure 
According to the Wall Street Journal, “Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC 
was examined at least 8 times in 16 years by the Securities and Exchange Commission and other 
regulators, who often came armed with suspicions” (Scannell). What is SEC's excuse on not 
identifying such a big scam? One of the researches shows that SEC main efforts were to look 
into the possibility of unlawful front-running, not the underlying legitimacy of Madoff's advisory 
operations. Hence the Commission missed what seems to be a relatively easy opportunity to 
mitigate, if not prevent, the tragic investor losses that later occurred (Langevoort). Moreover, 
Madoff was not registered as an investment firm, therefore he was not regulated with the SEC.  
It is a well-known fact that Harry Markopolos, a Wall Street Executive, submitted reports to SEC 
that there is a possible Ponzi Scheme several times. He said: “It took about five minutes of 
reading through a one page Madoff marketing brochure to know it was a fraud scheme” 
(Jackson).  
One of the statements during the Congress hearing suggested that the SEC was simply 
creating the illusion of genuine regulatory effort. Moreover, Bernie Madoff had personal 
connections to SEC and very big respect from that system. Indeed, “He was smart in 
understanding very early on that the more involved you were with regulators, you could shape 
regulation. If you’re very close with regulators, they’re not going be looking over your shoulders 
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that much. Very smart” (Creswell). This could imply that the SEC needed a massive change in 
its system because it missed the biggest fraudulent event. Additionally, Harry Markopolos in his 
book repeatedly said that SEC does not have resources or people who specialize in identifying 
financial frauds of that sort. In fact, "if you can't do the math and if you can't take apart the 
investment products of the 21st century backward and forward and put them together in your 
sleep, you'll never find the frauds on Wall Street” (Solomon).  
Fortune Magazine published an article called “How they failed to catch Madoff”, that 
describes how SEC indeed tried to investigate Madoff’s firm but was not successful at finding 
anything. When one of the complaints about Madoff got to SEC, two examiners - Peter Lamore 
and William Ostrow, had to investigate the case and speak with the firm. Both of them arrived at 
Bernard L. Madoff Securities in 2005 and Madoff himself greeted them which was a little bit 
surprising that the head of the firm is handling SEC examination.  Throughout the whole 
interview and examination that last quite some time, investigators left with nothing because 
Bernie Madoff was very good at lying and impressing people with his knowledge about Wall 
Street trading and the evolution of the business. He pointed out that his firm is using the 
algorithm that can only be executed by Madoff himself. The article further explains that, “On 
June 16, Ostrow and Lamore met with their boss, Nee, who directed them not to visit or contact 
any of Madoff’s feeder funds. Ostrow recalled that Nee warned them that Fairfield “is a $7 
billion customer and if you go and raise red flags there and they go ahead and pull all of their 
money from Bernie and we’re wrong, then we’ll be sued personally or the SEC itself.” (Fortune). 
This indicates how power plays a big role in what a person can get away with. People are scared 
of what powerful people can do and therefore, prefer not to get involved.   
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Martin Reimann and Oliver Schilke in their article “How Power Shapes Trust” 
introduced to readers a concept of the rational actor theory. That theory states that people will be 
trustworthy toward someone else only if being so is instrumental in maintaining that relationship. 
“Given that powerful people tend to have many partners to choose from, they place—relatively 
speaking—less value in any particular relationship, reducing the likelihood that they will behave 
in a trustworthy fashion" (Reimann). In other words, a powerful individual like Bernie Madoff 
can afford to betray others since he can easily find new people to work with. In this case, Mr. 
Madoff was extremely powerful in the financial world, therefore it was important for SEC to 
maintain that good relationship with him. 
After the scheme, investors and the financial community, in general, were furious that 
SEC and the government failed to investigate the fraud of that magnitude. So what have they 
done to prevent further schemes? The Housing Banking Committee created a bill to prevent 
another Bernie Madoff scheme. It features 4 parts of the bill that the SEC has to follow for 
further identifying the potential Ponzi schemes. For example, one of the features proposes that 
“The bill would authorize the SEC to pay cash bounties to whistleblowers who supply 
information leading to SEC enforcement cases and these bounties could go as high as 30% of the 
monetary sanctions in the relevant cases” (Pozen).  
Furthermore, another document that was made by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission thoroughly explains the post-reforms that have been made after Bernie Madoff's 
case. For example, the revitalization of the Enforcement Division. This division would focus on 
cases that will have a meaningful impact. The specialized units are industry experts who will 
work directly with teams of experienced attorneys and accountants. These units focus on the key 
areas of Structured and New Products, Market Abuse, Municipal Securities and Public Pensions, 
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Asset Management, and violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (SEC). In addition to 
that, the SEC provided 14 steps to reduce the possibility of fraud, and obviously, the agency is 
still improving and creating new ways to detect the Ponzi schemes. For example, one of the rules 
that the SEC created was for "A broker-dealer that maintains custody of customer securities and 
cash would be required to undergo a compliance examination — by a Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board-registered public accounting firm — that would include an audit of 
the controls the broker-dealer has in place to protect customer assets." This rule means that the 
third party will be required to evaluate the legitimacy of the investments. 
Some authors analyze actions that regulators should take to prevent Ponzi schemes from 
taking root and spreading, because Ponzi schemes are usually not easy to detect, since many of 
them operate in an opaque—even secretive—way, requesting confidentiality from investors. 
Therefore, the article emphasizes for “Regulatory agencies to increase efforts to detect Ponzi 
schemes by developing effective investigative tools, including red flags that point to investment 
fraud, tools to facilitate research on the Internet as well as through other mass media, and 
mechanisms to receive and act on complaints from the public” (Monroe, Hunter).  
So how can we, future investors, protect ourselves from another fraud? What have we learned? 
One of the biggest mistakes that these investors had is not doing their due diligence. This 
is something that we, as future investors, should always prioritize when investing a big amount 
of money with one advisor. Comparing the returns of your portfolio to the returns of the market 
would give a good indication of whether the returns can be legitimate.  
Methodology  
 
My study consists of both qualitative and quantitative methods that will be explained further. 
Firstly, I retrieved data of the S&P500 and S&P100 index closed prices from Yahoo Finance and 
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Bloomberg from 1991 to 2005 and measured yearly returns. Since there is no available data of 
Fairfield Sentry online, I took the data from the Harry Markopolos book “No One Would Listen,” 
who officially got the data at that time from a company called Access that worked with Bernard 
Madoff directly. I compared the S&P100 and S&P500 fund returns to the returns that Bernie Madoff 
Firm was reporting to his clients. I used this method since this will show whether his clients could 
have analyzed the data that was available to them at that time. Moreover, I measured the monthly 
returns of the S&P100 and Fairfield Sentry in order to calculate the Sharpe Ratio. Sharpe Ratio is 
used to help investors understand the return of an investment compared to its risk. The greater the 
portfolio's Sharpe ratio, the better its risk-adjusted performance.   
In addition to the quantitative analysis, I used published reports about the Bernie Madoff 
Ponzi Scheme. I included the interview and testimony of Harry Markopolos in regards to how he 
tried to turn Madoff to SEC for many years. Moreover, I used Markopolos’ official book called “No 
one would listen” that describes in more detail his process of figuring out the fraud and trying to 
turn it to the SEC. Lastly, I used legal documents from the Securities and Exchange Commission 
and the Housing Banking Committee that mostly focus on the post-reforms and the implementation 
of regulations.   
Empirical Results 
To reiterate, I hypothesized that the clients of Bernie Madoff had enough knowledge to identify 
the fraud earlier if they did their due diligence. Below, in table 1, I created the graph that 
illustrates the relationship between the S&P500 Index and Fairfield Sentry Limited Fund annual 
returns from 1991 to 2005 that have been obtained by a split-strike strategy. We can see that 
S&P500 is very volatile compared to Fairfield Sentry Fund which has very low volatility and 
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linear growth. Investors highly valued the combination of high returns and low volatility that 
Madoff’s funds provide.  
 
Table 1: Comparison of annual returns of Fairfield Sentry and S&P500 from 1991 to 2005 
 
 
In addition to Table 1, below I provided Table 2 graph that illustrates the relationship between 
the S&P100 Index and Fairfield Sentry Index annual returns. It is important to look at the 
S&P100 as well because Bernie Madoff was claiming to buy a basket of 30-35 blue-chip stocks 
of the S&P100 index. This graph shows that the market was very volatile, however, Fairfield 
Sentry remained stable with linear growth. The average rate was 12% for Fairfield Sentry no 
matter how the economy or market was moving. 
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Table 2: Comparison of annual returns of Fairfield Sentry and S&P100 from 1991 to 2005 
 
 
Moreover, I provided two tables with monthly returns of the Fairfield Sentry Fund and the S&P 
100 Index from January 1991 to December 2008. As we can see, from table 3, the red tabs 
indicate negative returns for Fairfield Sentry. It shows that there were almost no negative returns 
from 1991 to 2008. On the other hand, table 4 below illustrates that the S&P100 returns show 
many negative monthly returns. 
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Table 3: Fairfield Sentry Monthly Returns from January 1991 to December 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
1991 3.01% 1.40% 0.52% 1.32% 1.82% 0.30% 1.98% 1.00% 0.73% 2.75% 0.01% 1.56%
1992 0.42% 2.72% 0.94% 2.79% -0.27% 1.22% -0.09% 0.86% 0.33% 1.33% 1.36% 1.36%
1993 -0.09% 1.86% 1.79% -0.01% 1.65% 0.79% 0.02% 1.71% 0.28% 1.71% 0.19% 0.39%
1994 2.11% -0.44% 1.45% 1.75% 0.44% 0.23% 1.71% 0.35% 0.75% 1.81% -0.64% 0.60%
1995 0.85% 0.69% 0.78% 1.62% 1.65% 0.43% 1.02% -0.24% 1.63% 1.53% 0.44% 1.03%
1996 1.42% 0.66% 1.16% 0.57% 1.34% 0.15% 1.86% 0.20% 1.16% 1.03% 1.51% 0.41%
1997 2.38% 0.67% 0.80% 1.10% 0.57% 1.28% 0.68% 0.28% 2.32% 0.49% 1.49% 0.36%
1998 0.85% 1.23% 1.68% 0.36% 1.69% 1.22% 0.76% 0.21% 0.98% 1.86% 0.78% 0.26%
1999 1.99% 0.11% 2.22% 0.29% 1.45% 1.70% 0.36% 0.87% 0.66% 1.05% 1.54% 0.32%
2000 2.14% 0.13% 1.77% 0.27% 1.30% 0.73% 0.58% 1.26% 0.18% 0.86% 0.62% 0.36%
2001 2.14% 0.08% 1.07% 1.26% 0.26% 0.17% 0.38% 0.94% 0.66% 1.22% 1.14% 0.12%
2002 -0.04% 0.53% 0.39% 1.09% 2.05% 0.19% 3.29% -0.14% 0.06% 0.66% 0.10% 0.00%
2003 -0.35% -0.05% 1.85% 0.03% 0.90% 0.93% 1.37% 0.16% 0.86% 1.26% -0.14% 0.25%
2004 0.88% 0.44% -0.01% 0.37% 0.59% 1.21% 0.02% 1.26% 0.46% 0.03% 0.79% 0.24%
2005 0.51% 0.37% 0.85% 0.14% 0.63% 0.46% 0.13% 0.16% 0.89% 1.61% 0.75% 0.54%
2006 0.70% 0.20% 1.31% 0.94% 0.70% 0.51% 1.06% 0.77% 0.68% 0.42% 0.86% 0.86%
2007 0.29% -0.11% 1.64% 0.98% 0.81% 0.34% 0.17% 0.31% 0.97% 0.46% 1.04% 0.23%
2008 0.63% 0.06% 0.18% 0.93% 0.81% -0.06% 0.72% 0.71% 0.50% -0.06%
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Table 4: S&P100 Monthly Returns from January 1991 to December 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
1991 4.951% 6.829% 2.112% -0.003% 4.139% -4.598% 4.806% 0.921% -2.536% 1.118% -4.368% 9.531%
1992 -1.388% 1.236% -1.894% 3.141% 0.349% -1.806% 3.135% -2.903% -0.031% -0.414% 2.648% 0.993%
1993 1.243% 1.517% 1.644% -1.747% 2.564% -0.196% -0.559% 3.357% -1.546% 1.539% -0.572% 0.874%
1994 3.779% -2.677% -4.941% 0.672% 2.115% -3.208% 3.615% 2.905% -2.135% 2.256% -3.726% 1.699%
1995 1.838% 4.376% 3.086% 3.832% 4.036% 2.099% 3.251% -0.808% 4.820% -0.038% 3.859% 1.488%
1996 4.103% 1.166% 0.831% 1.329% 2.466% 0.234% -4.815% 2.153% 5.108% 2.859% 7.741% -1.828%
1997 7.197% -0.422% -4.078% 6.579% 5.218% 4.167% 7.982% -6.555% 5.166% -4.421% 5.126% 0.183%
1998 1.924% 7.069% 5.375% 1.431% -1.387% 4.824% -0.655% -14.525% 4.712% 8.897% 7.490% 4.650%
1999 6.028% -3.438% 4.555% 4.494% -2.515% 6.955% -3.007% 1.310% -2.870% 6.642% 3.028% 7.322%
2000 -4.865% -2.071% 10.346% -4.127% -2.543% 3.769% -0.963% 5.720% -8.168% -1.171% -7.144% -1.553%
2001 4.188% -10.415% -7.660% 9.100% 0.118% -2.199% -1.560% -7.194% -7.672% 2.125% 7.415% -0.089%
2002 -1.847% -1.932% 2.749% -7.869% -0.601% -7.385% -6.376% 0.421% -11.621% 10.792% 6.128% -7.121%
2003 -2.739% -1.667% 0.886% 8.482% 3.796% 1.488% 1.811% 0.819% -0.954% 4.296% 0.146% 5.769%
2004 1.730% 0.755% -2.375% -1.860% 0.786% 1.603% -2.925% 0.205% -0.726% 1.083% 3.111% 3.197%
2005 -1.810% 1.687% -2.190% -1.618% 2.126% -1.137% 2.602% -1.451% 0.447% -1.775% 3.201% -0.794%
2006 1.539% 0.354% 1.193% 1.385% -2.465% -0.282% 1.584% 2.257% 2.990% 3.313% 1.416% 1.658%
2007 0.965% -3.455% 0.955% 4.733% 3.200% -1.375% -2.457% 1.734% 3.930% 1.387% -4.469% -0.922%
2008 -6.212% -4.578% 0.015% 4.447% -0.289% -9.084% 0.485% 1.185% -8.012% -14.591% -6.743% -0.312%
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In addition to that comparison, using the monthly returns, I calculated Sharpe Ratio for 
both Fairfield Sentry Fund and S&P100 index. Sharpe Ratio is used to help investors understand 
the return of an investment compared to its risk. As we can see from table 5 below, I measured 
Sharpe Ratio for Fairfield Sentry and S&P100 using monthly returns from 1991 to 2008. The 
table shows that Fairfield Sentry is almost always above 1 with an average of 1.346, while the 
Sharpe Ratio for S&P100 is always below 1 with an average of 0.262. Sharpe ratio greater than 1 
is considered acceptable to good by investors, while the Sharpe ratio below 0 is considered not 
worth to invest in. The most interesting aspect of the performance for Fairfield is the very low 
volatility of the returns. This, in turn, leads to an unusually high Sharpe ratio. While the Sharpe 
ratio of the S&P100 is much less than the Fairfield Sharpe ratio, it is almost double the Sharpe 
ratio of investing in the Index over this period.  
To reiterate, Fairfield Sentry was supposed to be highly correlated with the S&P100 
according to Madoff's Strategy. This analysis indicates that Fairfield could not have such a high 
Sharpe Ratio with the S&P100 being below 1. 
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Table 5:  Sharpe Ratio yearly performance of Fairfield Sentry and S&P100 Index 
Year Sharpe Ratio 
  
Fairfield 
Sentry S&P100 
1991 1.473 0.435 
1992 1.127 0.125 
1993 1.052 0.423 
1994 0.923 0.009 
1995 1.620 1.498 
1996 1.737 0.552 
1997 1.453 0.433 
1998 1.758 0.399 
1999 1.450 0.554 
2000 1.319 -0.199 
2001 1.265 -0.185 
2002 0.664 -0.317 
2003 0.843 0.569 
2004 1.194 0.190 
2005 1.412 -0.030 
2006 2.556 0.815 
2007 1.201 0.120 
2008 1.172 -0.668 
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Conclusion: 
 
In all, this study shows that Bernard Madoff’s investors indeed have enough knowledge 
to figure out the fraud before they lost all of their money. Particularly, by looking at the graph of 
Fairfield Sentry returns, we can see that it shows a 45-degree rise year after year, while the S&P 
500 shows some volatility and cycles. The average rate was 12% for Fairfield Sentry no matter 
how the economy or market was moving. This is an interesting finding since it shows how 
intelligent people can be easily fooled by others and questions the idea of why the most 
sophisticated and smartest clients of the financial world did not do their due diligence and 
blindly invested with a very powerful financier. The psychology behind this fraud is very 
interesting both from Madoff’s side and his clients. This research reveals that Bernard Madoff 
indicates some traits of the sociopath because of his lack of remorse, superficial charm, and 
pathological egocentricity. It also shows how power plays a big role in trust. Madoff was using 
an affinity scheme to target the Jewish community and made his clients feel very special.  
Therefore, investors did not do their due diligence because if a person could not trust Bernie 
Madoff, then he or she could not trust anyone.  
Additionally, when it came to SEC, it needed a massive change in its system, because it 
does not have resources or people who specialize in identifying financial frauds of that sort, 
therefore the regulators came up with several safeguards and divisions to make sure this type of 
fraud does not happen again. The creation of a new Enforcement Division at SEC which consists 
of industry experts who will work directly with teams of experienced attorneys and accountants, 
will help further regulate investment firms.  
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From the investors’ perspective, we have to always do the due diligence. Indeed, the 
actual steps we can take to prevent the fraud is to understand a company’s business and its 
products or services before investing. It is important to look for the firm’s financial statements on 
the SEC’s EDGAR filing system and see if the firm is regulated by SEC. An investor should 
research whether the firm had run-ins with regulators or other investors. Moreover, it is essential 
to compare promised yields with current returns on well-known stock indexes.   
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